Too Unsafe to Monitor? How Board–CEO Cognitive Conflict and Chair Leadership Shape Outside Director Monitoring

Dennis Veltrop, Pieter‐Jan Bezemer, Gavin Nicholson, Amedeo PuglieseManagement组织行为UTD24

Academy of Management Journal2020-02-07University of Groningen; De Nederlandsche Bank; Edith Cowan University; Queensland University of Technology; Pompeu Fabra UniversityDOI

Citations113

Influential5

References135

Semantic Scholar

Research into boards of directors has provided mixed support for the view that outside directors’ independence or leadership by an independent chair improves monitoring. In this study, we use a micro-level approach to provide a better understanding of why outside directors have difficulty in monitoring the CEO. We highlight that an important reason for this lies in the boardroom dynamics associated with (a) outside directors’ cognitive conflict with the CEO and (b) the chair’s leadership of the board. Our inductive analyses of video observations of board meetings in five Australian corporations revealed the importance of chair participative leadership during disagreement episodes in the boardroom. Follow-up in-depth interviews of board meeting participants highlighted the importance of psychological safety as a key mechanism explaining why participative board chairs appear so effective in dealing with board–CEO cognitive conflict. We corroborate these results with a second, large-scale survey study involving data on 310 outside directors from 64 Dutch boards. Whereas prior work has mostly focused on the chair’s relationship with the CEO, we instead highlight the importance of the chair’s role as the leader of the board and identify board psychological safety as an important element shaping director monitoring within the confines of the boardroom.

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